An emerging literature on the role of unions in internationally active firms mitigates the general perception that exporting firms pay higher wages. In theory, fiercer competition due to the internationalization of a firm can have negative feedback effects into a union's bargaining position. We propose an empirical test of that prediction using German linked employer-employee data, where the information about plantand industry-level collective agreements enable us to partition plants into different bargaining regimes. To test the rent-sharing argument we exploit the individual worker information of our data and construct profitability measures that are free of the plant's skill composition. Our results indicate that the relative bargaining position of the union is weakened by trade if wages are bargained collectively at the plant-level. In line with the theoretical prediction we also show that a surge in those plants' export intensity is negatively associated with wages.
Introduction
The ongoing integration of global markets sparked a political and academic debate about the causes and consequences of the observable income-inequality. While skill biased technological change, increased outsourcing opportunities, and the exporter wage premium contributed to the surge in high-skilled wages 1 , earnings of the low-skilled were stagnant. 2 Beyond its positive effects on the high-skilled, globalization may also have contributed to the stagnating low-skilled earnings by magnifying the decline of the bargaining position of the unions. From a rent-sharing point of view it may well be that export participation leads to an increase in domestic wages in exporting firms due to additional revenues earned abroad (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Egger et al., 2011) . However, increasing international activities of firms may also weaken the relative bargaining position of local unions and therefore have a negative impact on wages (Montagna and Nocco, 2011; Eckel and Egger, 2009) . In this paper we address the relevance of international interdependencies in the presence of different bargaining regimes for wages using linked employer-employee data for the German manufacturing industries between 1996 and 2007. This rich data set is well suited for our purposes as it contains information on the export participation and the type of bargaining regime a plant belongs to.
In Germany, as in other countries, collective agreements still play an important role in the wage determination process. Collective agreements are conducted either at the firm-level or the industry-level. Firm-level agreements are typically better suited to account for local economic conditions, such as increasing international integration. 3 We expect plants covered by local agreements can or have to respond to changes in local conditions, whereas for industry-level bargaining both parties have to meet the needs for all or most of their members. Gürtzgen (2009b) supports this view by showing that wages in plants covered by firm-level agreements are positively associated with quasirents, which may be furthermore interpreted as evidence for rent-sharing. This view is also supported by Gürtzgen (2009a) , who shows that wages are lower in industries characterized by a larger plant-heterogeneity if wages are bargained at the industry-level.
Our results indicate that rent-sharing in exporting plants is lower if wages are either bargained at the plantor the industry-level, which is in line with the model of Montagna 1 For Germany, the evolution of wages is documented by Dustmann et al. (2009) . Attanasio et al. (2004) find a similar pattern for Columbia and they are able to link the rise in wage inequality partly to a tariff reform enforced in the 80's and 90's. 2 Exporting firms are larger, more productive, invest more intensively, and -most important in our context -pay higher wages to their employees. Based on the seminal work of Bernard et al. (1995) , the so called exporter wage premium in combination with the advancing global integration may have contributed to the rising wage inequality. See also Schank et al. (2007) for a survey of different studies. 3 The system of industrial relations in Germany is based on a dual system of representation by unions and work councils. For a brief description of the German system see Schnabel et al. (2006) . Addison et al. (2010 Addison et al. ( , 2011 provide an overview of the structure and developments in the German collective bargaining system. and Nocco (2011), Montagna and Nocco (2011) , and Eckel and Egger (2009) . Moreover, it underlines the importance of the wage setting mechanism and labor market institutions in the context of globalization.
Consistent with the existing literature, we also show that wages are higher in plants more open to globalization. However, once controlling for observed and unobserved worker and workplace characteristics the (residual) exporter wage premium decreases significantly (see also Schank et al., 2007) , indicating that the positive premium is to a large extend driven by assortative matching. 4, 5 In other words, differences in wages are at least partly driven by differences in workforce characteristics. Based on linked employer-employee data from Mexico, Frias et al. (2009) however find that only onethird of the Mexican exporter wage premium can be explained by unobservable differences in the workforce composition.
We also pay special attention to the interaction between export intensity and productivity. This goes beyond most of the Melitz (2003) applications, where firms either pay the same wages due to constant mark-ups as it is standard in a CES environment, or proportional shares of their profits, and where firms sort into an exporting regime according to their productivity. The descriptives for our profitability measure do not reveal a clear sorting of plants into domestic and export regimes as proposed by Melitz (2003) . Firms that export are on average more productive, but we also observe profitable non-exporters and unprofitable exporters (Powell and Wagner, 2011). Opromolla and Irarrazabal (2005) model the evolution of productivity in a dynamic Melitz (2003) framework and show that firms can endure negative profits in the short run when productivity stochastically increases over time. Chaney (2005) sketches the dynamic forces in a short run Melitz (2003) model where firms that got hit by the exogenous death rate can go on hold if their expected future profits are high enough so that they become profitable again. Thus, short-run dynamics are an important and realistic but -for the sake of simplicity -to a large extend ignored feature in most of the established heterogeneous firm models. More important, both approaches can explain why a clear sorting of firms into different regimes is not supported by the data. A firm's export intensity can thus be a spurious measure for productivity. Moreover, it is also likely that firms that start to export have to bear additional foreign beachhead costs in order to establish new foreign distribution facilities, which could lead to a decrease in profitability in the short-run. 4 Differences in the workforce composition are also in line with the models by, e.g. , Davidson et al. (2008 ), or Yeaple (2005 . Krishna et al. (2011) and Davidson et al. (2010) also find empirical evidence for matching effects and sorting. In a similar context Krishna et al. (2011) show for Brazil that the impact of trade openness on wages turns insignificant if sorting effects are simultaneously considered. 5 Klein et al. (2010) provide robust evidence on the existence of a negative exporter wage premium for low skilled workers for Germany.Based on the same data Schmillen (2011) demonstrates that the exporter wage premium shows up only in plants that export to more remote markets.
Theoretical considerations.
Our result indicate that rent-sharing is somewhat mitigated by more intensive trade on the plant level. This result can be rationalized by an intensified competition due to the internationalization of the firm. Firm or plant-level unions are more cautious about employment-effects of globalization when changes in the firm's environment cause potential employment cuts. Egger and Etzel (2009) analyze the effect of international competition on the relative position of the firm in the bargaining process between firms and the collective of workers in a oligopolistic competition model with unions in the labor market. Intensified competition due to the opening up of the country to international trade negatively affects wages in their oligopolistic continuum of industries framework. Firms in industries with higher labor productivity always pay higher wages. Intensified trade however reduces the rent-extracting ability of the union, which has a negative effect on wages. The intuition behind that result is that there are three countervailing effects. As standard in oligopolistic models going from autarky to free trade increases firms' labor demand and output, which has a positive impact on the wage rate demanded by the union. However, Egger and Etzel (2009) show that this positive effect is outweighed by i) lower firm profits due to more competition, and ii) a higher labor demand elasticity. A higher labor demand elasticity implies that unions are more cautious about the negative employment effects and therefore moderate their wage claims. The authors also extend their model by showing that centralized bargaining at the industry level yields qualitatively the same results. However, in their centralized bargaining environment unions still face the wage to employment trade-off due to the assumption of efficient wage bargaining about wages and industry-wide employment. This contrasts with Braun (2011) , where centralized bargaining is modeled as wage floor above the reservation wage. The finding that centralized bargaining has even stronger effects on the rent-extracting ability of the union only holds on the industry level where industries with higher exposure to trade should exhibit lower bargaining outcomes for homogeneous workers and homogeneous firms. We test this prediction by i) taking industry openness on the firm level into consideration and ii) by performing regressions on the industry level. The latter is most closely related to Egger and Etzel (2009) . Industries with higher average productivity should pay higher wages but increased competition due to international trade weakens the unions wage claims in favor of labor demand. 6,7 6 It is well documented that unions care about the well-being of their members. Donado and Wälde (2011) for instance show that unions play an important role in setting workplace safety standards. Plant-level unions are able to gather information about the health condition of the respective firm's workforce. Improvements in safety conditions not only improve the individual worker's well being, the firms are also better off due to the reduction of temporary shortfalls in its workforce caused by illness. 7 From an empirical perspective our study is also closely related to Blien et al. (2009) . The authors propose to take the type of wage setting mechanism into account when testing the wage curve. Based on the same data as our study, they find point estimates in line with Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) for firms that bargain wages collectively on the plant level. Montagna and Nocco (2011) where the union takes the negative employment effects due to a higher competition on the export market into account. Exporting plants' price elasticity of demand is higher than the domestic supply plants' price elasticity, which reduces their monopoly price setting power in the foreign market and thus leads to more moderate wage claims of unions located in the foreign profit center. Eckel and Egger (2009) or Skaksen (2004) both focus on the consequences of outsourcing on collective bargaining outcomes. Both papers show that the ability to outsource parts of the production chain to foreign affiliates reduces the bargaining position of the union by improving the multinational's fallback profit in case of disagreement during wage negotiations. Strengthening of the unions raises the multinational firm's incentive to invest abroad as reaction to the higher union's wage claims. Intensified international engagements by the firm is thus a potential threat for the union, which disciplines the wage claims.
Apart from the union papers discussed above, there is also a growing literature on potential labor market effects of trade on inequality and labor demand in heterogeneous firm models. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) The structure of the paper is organized as follows. The second section outlines the data used for our empirical analysis and identifies some estimation problems and potential solutions. The main estimation strategy is discussed in the third section, followed by the results in section 4 and some concluding remarks.
Data and empirical strategy
We use German linked employer-employee data (LIAB) provided by the Institute of Em- are still widely applied and predominantly conducted at the industry-or regional-level but also at the firm-level. Those agreements constitute a legally binding wage floor between the two bargaining parties. Moreover, firms normally extend this agreement also to all workers, even to the non-members. Therefore the bargaining coverage is a better indicator than union density for our purposes. Figure 1 shows that, although declining over time, in 2007 about 70% of all employees in German manufacturing are still covered by collective agreements.
The employment statistics cover all employees subject to social security contributions which represents about 80% of all employed persons in Western Germany and 86% in Eastern Germany (Bender et al., 2000) . Employees with no obligation to pay social security contributions, such as civil servants, workers in marginal employment and family workers, are excluded from the sample. The firms' social security contribution reports at the end of each year and additionally at the beginning and end of each employment spell are compulsory for the employer. The employment statistics also comprise detailed information on several individual characteristics such as age, gender, nationality, tenure and gross wage. Both data sets are merged by a common establishment identifier.
To include both west and east German manufacturing plants we focus on the period 1996-2007. 9 All Euro values are deflated for the base year 2000 using industry-level deflators from the OECD STAN database. To be consistent with the information from the individual data we use the total number of employees subject to social security contri- 10 The firm's capital stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method as proposed by Müller (2008 Müller ( , 2010 . 11 In order to avoid outliers to bias our results, we compute the capital intensity and capital output ratio and drop all observations below the 5 th and above the 95 th percentile of the respective distribution. Furthermore we keep only observations with valid information on capital for two consecutive years.
Productivity as measure for rent-sharing. Our preferred proxy for rent-sharing is total factor productivity (TFP). From a theoretical point of view rent-sharing is directly linked to productivity through the positive productivity/profits relationship. 12 The total factor productivity measure is superior since it allows to account for assortative matching and possible endogeneity problems arising from unobserved productivity shocks. The latter is addressed using the approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , which suggests to use intermediate inputs as proxy for those unobserved shocks. 13 The first problem is more complex. Without accounting for the work-force composition, the measured link be-tween profits and wages can be spurious due to assortative matching. We follow Iranzo et al. (2008) and tackle this problem by controlling for the firm's workforce composition (the average worker's ability) obtained from Mincerian wage regressions on the workerlevel. Moreover, total factor productivity allows to estimate the different parameters as input-shares and elasticities simultaneously within one regression.
How to measure global interdependency? On the firm-level our data comprise information about the export intensity of the plant, measured as the share of goods produced for the export markets. Unfortunately we cannot address outsourcing directly on the firm level due to missing information about imported intermediates. Moreover, there is little to no information about the export destination available. However, we argue that the international engagement is already a threat for the unions during negotiations.
Plants that are already active on international markets might find it easier to outsource parts of the production through foreign affiliates, which is already a threat for the union.
Besides the plant level information about exports we also use industry-level openness measure taken from the OECD in order to tie our analysis closer to Egger and Etzel (2009) .
With respect to the individual data, we focus on full-time employees only, as wages are reported as gross daily wages without any information on working hours. Therefore we exclude all observations for part-time workers, apprentices, interns and persons working at home. As the real gross daily wage will be of particular interest, we also have to deal with an additional issue concerning the wage information. Due to a reporting ceiling in social security system, wages are right-censored at the contribution limit. We impute wages by running Tobit regressions following the method proposed in Gartner (2005) . For each year we run a separate regression using age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, gender, foreign nationality as well as a full set of industry dummies as controls. The censored daily wages are replaced by predicted values obtained from the Tobit regression.
3 Empirical strategy and results
Main regression setup
To shed light on the interaction between rent-sharing and international engagement of the plant we estimate
as the preferred regression model. The dependent variable is the imputed log wage observed for individuum i employed in plant j at time t. As variables of interest we include the plant's export share to proxy exposure to international competition and TFP to proxy its profitability. Besides the identification of the exporter wage-premium and the magnitude of rent-sharing between plants and workers, our focus is also on the interaction between both. Controls for individual and plant characteristics purge For the main part of the analysis we also report random-effects regression results. We argue random-effects have the advantage that the identification relies on both the within-and the between variation of the data, which is important for our analysis since the export intensity relatively little variation over time.
Productivity measures
As argued in the introduction we are mainly interested in rent-sharing between firms and workers and to what extend the rent-sharing intensity hinges on the export behaviour of the plant. For that purpose we need a profitability measure on the plantlevel which is not plagued by the firm's workforce composition. Assortative matching implies that more productive firms have workers with a higher ability and that has to be taken into account when analyzing the degree of rent-sharing between plants and workers. We construct the firm's profitability measure according to a method proposed by Iranzo et al. (2008) who suggest to use the decomposed unobserved heterogeneity from Mincerian wage regressions as additional control for the firm's workforce composition when estimating total factor productivity. Therefore we first discuss how the human capital measures are computed, followed by a discussion of the total factor productivity estimation in a subsequent step.
Production function estimations
The consistent estimates of the worker productivity measure h allows us to estimate a skill-free firm productivity measure according to Iranzo et al. (2008) by estimating the production function
where capital and a weighted labor-aggregate is used as inputs for the production. The labor-aggregate weights workers by its average productivity as
Iranzo et al. (2008) use a second-order Taylor series expansion around the firm's mean ability in order to derive a testable production function in form of
We use ln(x + y) = lnx + ln(1 + y/x) and ln(1 + y/x) ≈ y/x in order to derive a log-linear form of the production function that can be estimated
where δ = β 1 2 (ρ − 1). The average ability of the workforce,h jt , and the firm's standard deviation in its workers ability, σ jt , are constructed using the consistently estimated worker productivity measures from equation (7).
The advantage of the second-order Taylor approximation is that it allows us to estimate the elasticity of substitution between different workers denoted by ρ. Iranzo et al. (2008) allow for substitutability between the workers within firms and estimate it instead of simply weighting the workers by its average ability when aggregating up the firm's input of workersL. Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) stress the importance of controlling for unobservable short-run productivity shocks when es-timating total factor productivity. Olley and Pakes (1996) use firms' investment as a proxy, whereas Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) use information about the firms' input of intermediate goods to weed out the simultaneity bias caused by omitting the unobserved productivity shocks. The authors are able to show that the main advantage of using intermediate inputs as proxy is that it allows to tackle another bias caused by zero investment flows reported by the firms simply because firms more likely report the use of intermediate inputs but not necessarily invest in their capital stock every period. We use the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method and estimate equation (5) in order to obtain an ability-free estimate for firms' total factor productivity.
Measuring human capital
Following Abowd et al. (1999) in general, and Andrews et al. (2008) as a particular application for the German data, we estimate unbiased worker-productivity measures by including firm fixed effects in the Mincerian wage regression. Abowd et al. (1999) suggest that the superior identification strategy is "person first and firms second". We thus estimate
where w it is the imputed daily compensation of individual worker i in time t andw is the grand mean of the imputed wage rate averaged over time. To reduce the omitted variable bias we also include person and firm characteristics gathered in the vectors x it and y j(i)t , where the latter is a weighted average control for firm j that employs worker i in time t. The larger the number of workers it employs, the higher the weight of the firm j.
The model we employ for constructing the human-capital index is different from (1) for two reasons. First of all we have to decompose the spell-fixed effect into its firm- Results for the human capital estimates. FELSDV regression results are reported in Table A1 . To construct the human capital index aŝ
we compute the worker fixed-effects from regression (7) asθ i . The human capital index thus comprises observable and unobservable components. The first is measured as level of skill attained by the individual, and the latter captures the estimated worker-ability.
The predictedĥ it allows us to construct the first and second moments of the humancapital distribution within the plant, which facilitates the estimation of regression (5). as the predicted residuals of regression (1) including the workforce composition controls. All regressions yield comparable coefficients for capital around 0.2 -0.4, and for labor ranging from 0.7 -0.75. 15 Especially for our application we have to disentangle the worker from the firm effects in order to test for assortative matching between firms and workers. 16 Their focus lies on identifying the firm fixed effects in Abowd et al. (1999) , which allows them to maximize the number of movers by using the full-sample of workers. Our sample is smaller and relies on information about the firm. We thus need matched employer-employee data, which also reduces the number of movers inside the firm. We therefore also propose a different identification strategy which relies more on the firm-level information when we estimate the firm-component. 
Results for the production function estimates

Data descriptive statistics.
Profitability measures. We argue that not controlling for the firm's workforce composition yields upward biased results when regressing firm profitability on wages. Table   2 compares the standard Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) As expected the gap between exporting and non-exporting firms is smaller when controlling for the work force composition. However, the gap between non-exporter and exporter productivity increases over time and across different percentiles of the productivity distribution. This productivity gap between exporters and non-exporters decreases when controlling for the work force composition in the lower Panel B, where the gap declines by 3 to 6 percent on average. Kernel density plots on the productivity distribution, reported in Table ( 2), reveal the well-known stylized fact that exporting firms are more productive. Following Del we also test whether TFP is pareto-distributed. However, the estimated shape-parameter is at a rather low k = 1.14 and the R-squared is lower than the proposed threshold reported in Del . See Table ( A3) for more details.
Regression results
The Exporter Wage Premium revisited. Results obtained from regression (1) are reported in Table ( 3). Worker and firm controls other than the variables of interest were omitted in the regression tables for the sake of clarity. 17
The benchmark specification includes controls for worker characteristics as tenure, age, a white collar dummy, and the level of skill attained by the respective employee. TFP is constructed following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . The means, standard deviations, 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of TFP are separately reported for nonexporters and exporters in the years 1996, 2002, and 2007 . All values are expressed as percentage of the yearly-industry average, weighted by inverse drawing probability weights. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at plant-level, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Controls included but not reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, medium-,high-skill and white-collar dummies, plant size, capital intensity, the share of females and part timers and dummies for the existence of a worker council and collective agreements at the firm-or industry-level. Additionally, all estimations include a full set of region-, sector-, and timedummies. Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008) . We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
Regression (1) confirms the general perception that plants more exposed to trade pay higher wages. Plants with a 10 percentage points higher export intensity pay on average 43 percent higher wages. However, this result might be driven by the worker's unobserved ability, resulting in a spurious correlation between export intensity and wages.
Controlling for the unobserved worker heterogeneity is rather demanding and the standard procedure is to include fixed effects. The major drawback of this solution is however that the identification of the export premium then solely relies on the within variation of the data. The between component is completely absorbed by the fixed effects.
The time invariant exporter-premium might by purged by the fixed-effect. 18 Moreover, the link between profitability and export status of a firm is less obvious. The inclusion of fixed effects without taking the plant's profitability into account reverses the sign of the export share measure. Regression (2) indicates that plants that increase their export activities by 10 percentage points tend to pay 16 percent lower wages. The effect is however not statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, we have serious doubts about the reliability of that result.
Export intensity is a kind of proxy for productivity or profitability which is in fact less variable then productivity itself. As in Opromolla and Irarrazabal (2005) it is likely that a change in a firm's exports is followed by a sluggish adjustment in productivity and profits towards its new steady state. 19 If the export wage premium is driven by rentsharing as in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) then we would expect that the adjustment 18 Fixed effects regression can help to identify a causal effect by investigating how changes in the export behavior feed back into wage changes. We would expect that an increase in a firm's export intensity is associated with a higher profitability which in turn increases wages due to rent sharing. 19 In their model the evolution of productivity is model by a Brownian motion with drift. of wages is determined by the adjustment in the plant's profitability measure, which is in fact more variant over time than the export intensity. For the same sample we obtain a positive and highly significant coefficient for the profitability measure TFP in regression (3) -(4), which confirms our perception that the time invariant export intensity is not the appropriate measure to identify the export premium based on within variation of the data. The coefficient in (4) translates into 0.25 percent wage increase for a worker that switches to a 10 percent more productive firm. Including fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the effect to a 0.11 percent increase in the wage rate.
Most interestingly, the negative coefficient of the export share vanishes once we include the productivity measure TFP in the regressions. The coefficient of the export share is positive, but the magnitude is small and the effect is not significant. The coefficients of TFP do not change by much. This is a first hint that controlling for productivity is important for the identification of the exporter wage premium.
Based on that outcome we investigate the link between the export-status of the firm and its profitability by including the interaction between both. 20 We are able to show that there is some interaction between export-intensity and rent sharing. This interaction effect has to be taken into consideration in order to avoid the counterfactual result of a negative export premium. Powell and Wagner (2011) already showed that the exporter productivity-premium is largest at the lowest quantile. Employing quantile regressions they are able to show that the gap between exporting and non-exporting firms' productivity is largest for lower quantiles of the firms' productivity distribution.
Our results suggest that the export wage-premium is in fact dependent on the productivity of the plant. Rent-sharing between firms and workers gets smaller in plants more exposed to trade. Regressions (1) to (4) in Table 4 include both export share and the profitability measure TFP, plus the interaction between both. We obtain positive coefficients for both the export share and the profitability measure in all regressions.
Both the coefficient for TFP and the coefficient for the export share variable are larger when including the interaction. To compute the marginal effects for both variables of interest one has to take the interaction into account. The negative interaction translates into a lower marginal effect for productivity for firms more exposed to trade, which can be interpreted as lower rent-sharing between firms and workers. Comparing two firms with the same productivity we find that the exporting firm pays a relatively lower wage rate. The magnitude of the effect becomes lower when we include also person or spell dummies. However, strikingly the results are significant but only for OLS and person fixed-effects regressions. For the spell fixed-effect regressions we find that the exportshare measure is insignificant and that the interaction is significant only at the 10 percent level. Our OLS results indicate that plants which are 10 percent more productive pay 0.7 percent higher wages. 21 Secondly, plants with 10 percentage points higher export intensity pay on average 8 percent higher wages. 22 Evaluated at the mean export share of 0.41 the interaction translates into a marginal effect for TFP equal to 0.03. Thus, the magnitude of rent sharing between firms and workers reduces from 0.6 (non-exporters) to 0.3 percent (exporters). Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant-level in (1)-(2) and at the industry-level in (3)-(4), * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Controls included but not reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, medium-,high-skill and white-collar dummies, plant size, capital intensity, the share of females and part timers and dummies for the existence of a worker council and collective agreements at the firm-or industry-level. Additionally, all estimations include a full set of region-, sector-, and time-dummies. Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008) . We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
Overall the exporter wage premium is positif. However, if we compare to plants with the same export intensity but different productivity levels, the premium gets smaller the more profitable the firms is. For plants with a productivity 5 (close to the minimum) we find an marginal effect equal to 0.3. Evaluated at the mean the premium is around 0.048.
As a last check we will also consider regressions with industry-level openness measures in order to tie our empirics closer to Egger and Etzel (2009) . The results confirm the regressions based on the export intensity. Regression (3) to (4) indicate that wages in more open economies tend to be higher overall. The rent sharing between firms and workers is also positive. On the firm level we also find that the magnitude of rent sharing tends to be much more pronounced in industries which are less open.
The role of collective bargaining. One of the explanations why exporting firms may pay relatively lower wages than non-exporting firms is the presence of unions that might be threatened by international competition and the wage-to-employment trade off. To test that relationship we exploit the information about the type of collective agreements.
On the firm-level we expect that export intensity has some feedback effects into the bargaining outcome of exporting and non-exporting firms. The union sets an industrywide wage by facing the tradeoff between industry labor demand and wages by taking the plant-level export share into consideration. According to Egger and Etzel (2009) , openness on the industry-level should have similar effects on plants in both collective bargaining regimes. (1) However, the exporter wage premium and the interaction is significant only for firms that bargain collectively. The positive productivity premium in the collective agreement regime can be explained by an efficiency wage approach. Firms can always depart from the union wage by paying wages above the industry-level agreements. Supporting Egger and Etzel (2009), Eckel and Egger (2009) , and Montagna and Nocco (2011) , we find that the negative interaction on the plant-level only holds only in the collective agreement regime. In line with Egger and Etzel (2009) we also find similar results employing industry-level openness measures, but again only for the collective bargaining regime.
Our data allows the distinction between plantand industry-level agreements so that we can go one step further by disentangling the collective bargaining regime into a plantand an industry-level regime in a subsequent step. (6) in each panel are based on the subsample of centralized collective bargaining plants. 23 Though we have different number of observations the results are comparable since we cluster standard errors on the plant level. Iranzo et al. (2008) . We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
Regressions indicated by (1) use an OLS estimator, (2) run fixed-effects regressions, and
(3) the spell-random effects model. All regressions still reveal a positive relationship between plant profitability and wages paid to the workers. Additionally, the export-share and the interaction between export-share and the plant-level profitability measure are negative and significant for OLS and random-effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant-level in the upper panel and the industry-level in the lower panel, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Controls included but not reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, medium-,high-skill and white-collar dummies, plant size, capital intensity, the share of females and part timers and a dummy for the existence of a worker council. Additionally, all estimations include a full set of region-, sector-, and time-dummies. Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008) . We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the implications of global competition for the wage setting mechanism in the presence of unions. Quite to the contrary of common beliefs, our results indicate a weakening of the unions bargaining position when firms go global. Our analysis is based upon numerous theoretical contributions that demonstrate through which channels outsourcing or intensified dependency on foreign markets affect collective bargaining outcomes. A benevolent union responds to fiercer competition generated through outsourcing or intensified trade relations by lowering its wage claims in order to protect their members' work places. As a result unions claim a lower share of the rents generated within the plant. Our preferred measures for rent-sharing is a profitability measure that is purged from the plant's skill-composition. In line with the theoretical predictions outlined in the introduction we are able to show that a surge in collective bargaining plants' export intensity is negatively associated with wages. The well-known exporter wage premium shows up in our regressions when the identification is based on both the within and the between variation of the data and/or if we explicitly allow for interactions between exports and productivity by taking a plant's profitability into account. Moreover, the export-share turns out significant only in plants that either bargain wages collectively or individually on the plant level. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first connecting different wage bargaining regimes to the exporter wage premium based on matched employer-employee data. 
Appendix A. Additional Tables
Age 0.076 * * * 0.075 * * * 0.073 * * * (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Age 2 /100 −.084 * * * −.082 * * * −.079 * * * (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Age 3 /1000 0.003 * * * 0.003 * * * 0.003 * * * (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Employment (ln) 0.039 * * * 0.034 * * * (0.001) (0.001) Capital intensity (ln) 0.023 * * * (0.001)
Observations 10107425 10107382 7611812
Rubust standard errors in parenthesis, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Person, firm, year, and industry dummies included in all regressions. Person fixed effects of specification (2) are used to construct human capital measures consisting of observed and unobserved characteristics. These human capital measures are in turn used to construct firm-level human capital index variables such as the meanh jt and the standard deviation σ jt .
Exporter vs. non-exporter. Our later analysis hinges on the constructed total factor productivity measure which is our preferred proxy for firm profitability. The kernel density plot indicates that exporters in our sample are on average more productive.
Moreover, the plots also reveal that productivity is normal distributed around the mean.
Thus, there is no clear cutoff as predicted by Melitz (2003) and as indicated by the density plot and the test statistics presented in Table 2 , firm profitability is not Pareto distributed.
Summary statistics. Table A2 reports further information about the variables used in the regressions covering unweighted and weighted means and standard deviation measures. The former are for interpretation of the regression results reported in the next section and the latter are weighted by an inverse drawing probability, which increases the representation-power of the data. The weighting matrixes have to be treated with caution. We refrain from using them in the main regressions because of the matched employer-employee setup, where the firm dimension is inflated due to the matching of the person data. We also distinguish between individual-and establishment-level, where variables are collapsed to the establishment-year dimension for the establishment-level Pareto test for the TFP estimates. Del : "Formally, consider a random variable X (e.g., our TFP) with observed cumulative distribution F(X). If the variable is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter ks, then the OLS estimate of the slope parameter in the regression of ln(1 -F(X)) on ln (X) plus a constant is a consistent estimator of -ks and the corresponding R 2 is close to one." 
